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The CEE histories have known numerous tides in instituting genuine electoral 
democracies. The rapid adoption of the representative rule and the myriad of new 
parties engaged in the electoral competition, soon after the fall of communism, were 
primarily conceived as trademarks in explaining political transitions. Aiming at 
creating closer links between the electorate and the political elites, shaping voters’ 
allegiance to the national political system, the post-communist electoral processes 
were promoting strongly fragmentised and volatile party systems1 described by 
the existence of blurred links with the civil society2. Acting as public utilities3 and 
not as chains of representation, the newly emergent parties were mainly oriented 
towards patronage and clientelistic practices4, neglecting the development of local 
implantations or the consecration of responsive political leaders. Consequently, a 
non-differentiated political landscape was rapidly configured, conducing to volatile 
patterns of electoral support throughout the territorial units.
Processes often associated with the nationalisation of the party systems in 
Western democracies, accounting for the state building evolutions or the institutional 
arrangements, the uniform party electoral support in different regions/constituencies 
or the stabilisation of electoral swings over time5 were mainly linked to the decrease 
of salient cleavages within contemporary societies6, the governmental authority 
centralisation or the active leadership roles in shaping electoral preferences7. 
Traditionally, the analogous citizens’ choices across electoral constituencies are 
connected to a change in the balance of power between centre and periphery, 
1 David OLSON, ”Party System Consolidation in New Democracies of Central and Eastern 
Europe”, Political Science, vol. 46, no. 3, 1998, pp. 432-464.
2 Herbert KITSCHELT, ”Citizens, Politicians, and Party Cartelization: Political Representation 
and State Failure in Post-industrial Democracies”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, 
no. 2, 2000, pp. 149-179.
3 Ingrid van BIEZEN, Petr KOPECKY, ”The State and the Parties: Public Funding Public 
Regulation and Rent Seeking in Contemporary Democracies”, Party Politics, vol. 13, no. 2, 2007, 
pp. 235-254.
4 Petr KOPECKY, ”Political Parties and the State in Post-Communist Europe: The 
Nature of Symbiosis, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics”, vol. 22, no. 3, 2006, 
pp. 251-273.
5 Daniele CARAMANI, The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of National Electorates 
and Party Systems in Western Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004.
6 Ibidem, p. 32.
7 Pradeep K. CHHIBBER, Ken KOLLMAN, The Formation of National Party Systems, 
Princeton University Press, 2004; IDEM, ”Party Aggregation and the Number of Parties in 
India and the United States”, American Political Science Review, vol. 92, no. 2, 1998, pp. 329-342.
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the reconfiguration of governmental financial policies regarding regional party 
strongholds or to the transformations occurred in the national elite configurations1. 
Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to the explanation of a similar phenomenon 
emerging in the new democracies. 
Recent studies on party systems nationalisation in Central and Eastern Europe2 
revealed rather puzzling results. Although the level of nationalisation greatly varies 
in these new democracies, the highest levels of voting homogeneity seem to appear in 
countries considered to be more exposed to the re-emergence of visible cleavages3 such 
as the Czech Republic (0.89), Hungary (0.89), Slovenia (0.88), preserving lower levels 
in countries where ethnic divides are identifiable (Bulgaria (0.86), Slovakia (0.82), 
Lithuania (0.87))4. If in these post-communist countries, the modern history would 
suggest strong regional differences, the traces of ”real socialism” that lasted almost 
half of a century and the weakness of the states pushed these frail political systems 
into electoral uncertainty. The high centralisation of the inherited state structure, the 
impressive electoral volatility5 and the rapid decrease in the citizens’ mobilisation6 
constitute some of the reasons for the surfacing of such territorial regularities. 
Within this framework, Romania (and Bulgaria) displayed a rather idiosyncratic 
democratisation process. The particular features of the communist regime that 
repressed the liberalisation process in the 80s, the lack of distinctiveness between the 
regime and the Communist Party and the cult of personality recommended this case as 
an example of sultanism7. The absence of dissident movements during the communist 
decades able to articulate the regime change and party alternatives8, the outstanding 
membership records of the Communist Party which entrapped a considerable part 
of the Romanian society9 constitute some of the reasons for a slower transition and 
1 Mark P. JONES, Scott MAINWARING, ”The Nationalisation of Parties and Party Systems: 
An Empirical Measure and an Application to Americas”, Working paper #304 – February 
2003, Kellogg Institute for International Studies, available online: http://nd.edu/~kellogg/
publications/workingpapers/WPS/304.pdf, pp. 5-7 (last accessed on November 2011).
2 The party system nationalisation and nationalisation of individual parties in this article 
are following the same methodological guidelines as provided by Daniel Bochsler. The indicator 
used to measure the degree of electoral homogeneity across the territorial constituencies was 
developed in ”Measuring Party Nationalisation: A New Gini-based Indicator that Corrects for 
the Number of Units”, Electoral Studies, vol. 29, no. 1, 2010, pp. 155-168.
3 Herbert KITSCHELT, Zdenka MANSFELDOVA, Radoslaw MARKOWSKI, Gabor 
TOKA (eds.), Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation and Inter-Party 
Cooperation, Cambridge UP, 1999, pp. 157-195. See also Ingrid VAN BIEZEN, Political Parties 
in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern East-Central Europe, Palgrave, Macmillan, 
Houndmills/Basingstoke, 2003.
4 Daniel BOCHSLER, ”The Nationalisation of Post-Communist Party Systems”, Europe-
Asia Studies, vol. 62, no. 5, 2010, pp. 807-827/p. 825.
5 Jan BIELASIAK, ”The Institutionalisation of Party Systems in Post-communist States”, 
Comparative Politics, vol. 34, no. 2, 2002, pp. 189-210.
6 Susan ROSE ACKERMAN, From Elections to Democracy: Building Accountable Government 
in Hungary and Poland, Cambridge University Press, 2005.
7 Juan LINZ, Alfred STEPAN, ”The Effects of Totalitarianism cum Sultanism on Democratic 
Transition: Romania”, in IDEM, ”Modern Nondemocratic Regimes”, in Problems of Democratic 
Transition & Consolidation, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1996, pp. 344-366. 
8 Vladimir TISMĂNEANU, Reinventarea politicului. Europa Răsăriteană de la Stalin la Havel, 
Polirom, Iaşi, 1997, p. 162.
9 The Romanian Communist Party displayed the highest membership rolls in the region. 
Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, Nemira, Bucureşti, 1999, pp. 46-57; IDEM, ”The Burden of 
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drawbacks in the articulation of stable party systems. The late modernisation process1 
and the impact of the Communist Party’s programmatic actions on homogenising the 
Romanian society2 forecasted a non-distinctive political landscape. However, contrary 
to our expectations, the Romanian electoral development presents remarkable low 
levels of territorial uniformity (0.79). Although the ethnic fragmentation can partially 
account for these differences, as suggested at the level of the literature3, it is to be 
noticed that the share of the Hungarian population living in Romania (6.6%) is lower 
than in Slovakia (9.7%) and substantially inferior to the presence of Turks in Bulgaria 
(9.4%) or the total share of Lithuanian minorities (8% Russo phones, and 5.6% Polish 
according to the 2011 census). Conversely, the Romanian party system nationalisation 
score is rather similar to the other Baltic States – Latvia (0.75) and Estonia (0.77) – 
where according to the recent census, the Russians represent one quarter, respectively 
one third of the total population. 
Without ignoring the cultural and ethnic diversity of the Romanian context4, 
this study considers the Romanian case as an atypical example of party system 
nationalisation. The lack of internal divides within society constitutes the perfect 
environment for political indistinctiveness and thus for the emergence of uniform 
electoral patterns. The defective political culture, the quest for governance and 
not representation5 theoretically impose a lack of political differentiation between 
territorial units or different logics in the electoral game (local or national elections). 
Still, the overall estimates concerning the party system nationalisation portrayed a 
divergent electoral development. In what follows, the article focuses on an in-depth 
analysis and explanation of voting behaviour patterns within the territorial units. The 
history of parties’ divergent/convergent paths towards nationalisation during the 
post-communist period will be scrutinised by taking into account the electoral results 
in local (mayoral or County Council levels) and national contests (parliamentary 
elections). The second part of the research will pinpoint to the main political 
explanations for the low levels of party systems nationalisation. The Romanian 
paradoxical situation will be explored by mobilising the two alternative hypotheses 
regarding the importance of state regulations (party laws and electoral laws) but also 
by taking into account the organisational development of the Romanian political 
parties.
Politics. Public Space, Political Participation and State Socialism”, Studia Politica. Romanian 
Political Science Review, vol. II, no. 2, 2002, pp. 329-349; Stelian TĂNASE, Elite şi societate. 
Guvernarea Gheorghiu Dej 1948-1965, Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2006, pp. 55-62.
1 Daniel Louis SEILER, ”Pot fi aplicate clivajele lui Rokkan în analiza partidelor din 
Europa Centrală”, in Jean-Michel DE WAELE (ed.), Partide politice şi democraţie în Europa centrală 
şi de est, Romanian transl. by Ramona Coman, Ana Maria Dobre, Dorina Iuga and Ninucia Pilat, 
Humanitas, Bucureşti, 2003, p. 166. See also Daniel BARBU, Politica pentru barbari, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2005.
2 Pascal DELWIT, Jean Michel DE WAELE (eds.), Le mode de scrutin fait-il l’élection?, 
Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, collection Sociologie politique, Bruxelles, 2000.
3 Daniel BOCHSLER, ”The Nationalization of Political Parties: A Triangle Model applied 
on the Eastern and Central European Countries”, CEU Political Science Journal, vol. 1, no. 4, 
2006, pp. 6-37. See also IDEM, ”It Is Not How Many Votes You Get, But Also Where You Get 
Them. Territorial Determinants and Institutional Hurdles for the Success of Ethnic Minority 
Parties in Post-communist Countries”, Acta Politica, vol. 46, no. 3, 2011, pp. 217-238.
4 Daniel L. SEILER, ”Pot fi aplicate clivajele lui Rokkan...cit.”, pp. 170-171.
5 Daniel BARBU, Politica pentru barbari, cit., p. 5.
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THE ROMANIAN PARTY SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT: AN OVERVIEW
The post-communist party systems were mainly described as suffering of 
profound instability. The six general elections which were held in Romania after 1990 
showed a continuous variation in the effective number of parties. Different analytical 
categories were rapidly applied as the system passed from one and a half party in 
1990, to a multiparty system without dominant party in 1992-2000, 2004-2008, 2008-
2012 and to a multiparty system with dominant party in 2000-20041. This continuous 
shift in the party system characteristics was initially balanced by an incipient 
bipolarisation founded on a political tension between post-communist parties 
and ex-communist parties2. The firsts were claiming in the early 90s the interwar 
democratic legacy and dissident positions during the communist regime, while the 
latter were being labelled as successors of the Communist nomenclature, illustrating 
a success story of ”redeemed communist inheritance”3. Additionally, an ethnic divide 
between nationalistic and the anti-nationalistic positions4 was rapidly configured, 
translated mainly as an opposition between the representatives of the main minority 
of the country: the Hungarians’ leaders and some parties presenting extremist and 
anti-Magyar claims.
The choice of a highly inclusive electoral system in the early 90s, proportional 
representation with closed list in multimember constituencies, produced a highly 
fragmented political scene. The main outcome of these institutional arrangements 
was the inflation in the number of parties that registered their electoral lists in 
subsequent general elections: 71 (1990), 155 (1992), 75 (1996), 73 (2000), 64 (2004)5, 
29 (2008). The adoption of complementary regulations or amendments: for instance 
higher electoral thresholds: 3% in 1992, 5% for parties and 8-10% for coalitions (after 
2000)6 had a limited impact on diminishing the highly divided electoral scene, the new 
rhetorical scapegoat in explaining the lack of effective governance7. This inflation in 
the general number of parties is however misleading due to the presence of minority 
1 Cristian PREDA, ”Système politique et familles partisanes en Roumanie post-
communiste”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. II, no. 2, 2002, pp. 555-579/
p. 557. See also Jean Michel DE WAELE, ”Consolidare democratică, partide şi clivaje”, in Jean 
Michel DE WAELE (ed.), Partide politice şi democraţie...cit., pp. 177-197.
2 Cristian PREDA, ”Les partis politiques dans le postcommunisme roumain”, Studia 
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. III, no. 4, 2003, pp. 943-987.
3 Anna GRZYMALA-BUSSE, ”The Roots of Regeneration: Communist Practices and Elite 
Resources”, in IDEM, Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East 
Central Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, pp.19-69 (for the Romanian case 
see pp. 269-270). See also András BOZÓKI, John T. ISHIYAMA, ”Introduction and Theoretical 
Framework”, in IDEM (eds.), The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe, M.E. 
Sharpe, Armonk, NY, 2002, pp. 3-13.
4 Cristian PREDA, ”Les partis politiques...cit.”, p. 956.
5 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic din România, Nemira, 
Bucureşti, 2008, p. 78.
6 Cristian PREDA, ”The Romanian Political System after the Parliamentary Elections 
of November 30, 2008”, Studia Politica. Romanian Political Science Review, vol. IX, no. 1, 2009, 
pp. 9-35.
7 Jean-Benoit PILET, Jean-Michel DE WAELE, ”Electoral Reforms in Romania. Towards a 
Majoritarian Electoral System?”, European Electoral Studies, vol. 2, no. 1, 2007, pp. 63-79/p. 77.
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organisations, or the concentration of citizens’ votes on the main political competitors 
(between 84.58% and 97.83% of the total share of the parliamentary seats)1. 
Despite of volatile party structures, the Romanian party system seemed to stabilise 
during the recent years. Alike other parties in the region, these political organisations 
suffered successive splits and fusions. From ten political parties that passed at least 
three electoral tests, three of them disappeared from Parliament in 2000 and another 
one failed in 2008 general elections. Moreover, one important member of the social-
democratic family shifted from a leftist position towards centre-right ideological 
claims after 2000, and the main successor party changed its name four times. Ironically, 
the only party that can be considered rather consistent with its initial discourses and 
which conserved both the identity and organisation unchanged is not officially a 
party, but an organisational umbrella, ensuring the ethnic minority representation2: 
the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians. In what follows, the study will concentrate 
on the main Romanian parties that succeeded to preserve their organisation and to 
gain seats in public offices (although some examples of the other important parties 
for the post communist period will be mentioned): the liberals (PNL), the democrats/
popular (PD/PDL), the social democrats (PDSR/PSD), the nationalists (PRM) and the 
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians (UDMR).
PARTY NATIONALISATION IN GENERAL AND 
EUROPEAN ELECTIONS
The shifting formulas of the party system and the continuous organisational 
change are far from being exceptional traits. The post-communist parties, rapidly 
confronted with a crisis of legitimacy3, had to reinvent themselves as they had to deal 
with political and party instability. Additionally, the visible decline in the electoral 
participation signalled the party failure in mobilising citizens’ attention. In the first 
general elections held in Romania in 1990 – 86.19% of the citizens casted their votes 
for the selection of the new Parliament. Soon after, the turnout declined to 58.1% in 
2004 and touched only 39.12% of the Romanian electorate in 2008 (and this, despite 
the adoption of a new electoral law meant to revitalise the voters’ interest). The civic 
disengagement in relations to politics is even higher than in any other country in 
the region (see Table 1). The electoral turnout in the 2008 elections represented less 
than half of the electoral turnout in 1990. As suggested by Bochsler, an explanation 
for this dramatic drop lays in the decision to decouple the presidential and the 
legislative competitions. However, the figures remain ridiculously low even for the 
new democratic settings. 
Testifying of a lack of interest in the electoral contests, the general turnout in 
the European elections confirmed the disengagement trends, institutionalising a 
convergent pattern with Western democracies where this type of scrutiny has been 
1 Cristian PREDA, ”Système politique et familles partisanes...cit.”, p. 561.
2 Frances MILLARD, Elections; Parties and Representation in Post communist Europe, Palgrave, 
MacMillan, 2004, p. 235.
3 Mattei DOGAN, ”The Erosion of Confidence in Thirty European Democracies”, 
Comparative Sociology, vol. 4, no 1-2, 2005, pp. 11-54.
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described as ”second order national elections”1. Only 29.46% of the Romanian voters 
presented themselves to the polls during the first elections for the EP (similar to the 
Bulgarian case – 28.6%), and 27.67% in the subsequent elections in 2009, considerably 
lower than the European average 43.24%, but comparable to the other countries in the 
region2. Although a diverse society, with different cultural traditions, it appears that 
in what concerns electoral turnouts, there are no important differences between the 
territorial units. Considered to be a fundamental feature of the parliamentary regimes 
that abide more deeply by literal interpretations of representation3, the turnouts in 
Romania are convergent to more general processes that mark civic disenchantment 
with politics. (See Table 2).
The widespread phenomenon of absenteeism gradually developed in all the 
constituencies, following a parallel process, concerning the rising uniformity in 
the party electoral support across the territorial units. When looking at the first ten 
years after the fall of communism, parties’ electoral results greatly varied throughout 
the country. Although displaying lower levels than other CEE countries, the party 
system nationalisation score gradually increased from 0.65 in the early 90s up to 0.79. 
The decision to introduce a mixed electoral system in 2008 in which the individual 
competitors have the opportunity of being directly elected in their colleges (if they 
had gathered more than 50% of the votes) did not substantially alter these voting 
patterns. The votes casted at the constituency level seem to obey the same uniformity 
rule, suggesting a reduced role of personal voting. 
These analogous electoral patterns can also be depicted in the cases of individual 
parties. Despite of high variations in the electoral behaviour during the last 20 years, 
the main Romanian parties’ nationalisation scores registered high values. Given 
this premature phenomenon, the homogenisation of the electoral support is not an 
expression of the rapid party reach within the territorial units but rather a sign of 
failure in developing strongholds. Consequently, there is no surprise that the social 
democrats, inheriting the powerful organisational structures of the former Communist 
Party4 or the PRM, the Romanian nationalist party (displaying however successor 
elements inherited from the communist past5) were the main competitors exhibiting 
lower levels of party nationalisation than the newly created right wing parties. 
However, when focusing on parties ”that counts” for the Romanian transition, only 
two main competitors show reduced levels of nationalisation: CDR and UDMR. In 
the first case, Romanian Democratic Convention represented a coalition of parties 
that dominated the anticommunist partisan scene after 1989. After 2000, following a 
1 Karlheinz REIF, ”European Elections as Member State Second-Order Elections Revisited”, 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 31, no. 1-2, 1997, pp. 115-124, See also Michael MARSH, 
”Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections”, British Journal of 
Political Science, vol. 28, no. 4, 1998, pp. 591-607.
2 The turnouts in CEE were remarkably low in the EP’s elections: Slovakia (19.63), 
Lithuania (20.54) Poland (24.53), Slovenia (28.02), Czech Republic (28.22). With slightly higher 
score: Hungary (36.28), Bulgaria (37.49), Estonia (43.90). The only country that registered 
turnouts above the European average: Latvia (52.57%).
3 Norman SCHOFIELD, Itai SENED, Multiparty Democracy. Elections and Legislative Politics, 
Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006, pp. 1-9.
4 Lavinia STAN, ”Romania: In the Shadow of the Past”, in S.P. RAMET (ed.), Central and 
Southeast European Politics since 1989, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 383.
5 Daniel Louis SEILER, ”Pot fi aplicate clivajele lui Rokkan...cit.”, p. 171. 
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governing period, the coalition preserved only limited levels of support, mainly in 
the Western part of the county. The electoral decline, but also the liberals’ decision 
to run independently in the elections, resulted in a significant drop of the party 
nationalisation score. In the second case, the UDMR’s ethnic votes explain the low 
levels of party nationalisation. Besides these two main examples partially accounting 
for the low levels of party system nationalisation during the 90s, several other post-
communist competitors illustrate reduced levels of nationalisation. These ephemeral 
nationalistic and left wing oriented parties disappeared after 2000. Considered to be 
as the main challenger to the Hungarian minority rights, PUNR was initially created 
as a regional party that embraced nationalistic discourses. The party that succeeded 
to gain representation in Parliament during the first three post communist elections 
had set its primary objective to fight against extensive minority rights. Consequently, 
PUNR’s electoral support depended on the geographical display of the Hungarian 
minority determining low levels of nationalisation (around 0.6 in 1992 and 1996). 
Correspondingly, the Socialist Labour Party (PSM) won 13 mandates in the Lower 
Chamber of the Romanian Parliament in 1992 but displayed a nationalisation score 
of only 0.67.
Seemingly, in the Romanian case, the PR formula encouraged low levels of party 
nationalisation. By the same token, the electoral law favoured the political competitors 
that disposed of uniform electoral support throughout the country. With the exception 
of the ethnic party, the political competitors that failed to nationalise their votes 
disappeared from the parliamentary map. The main parties’ high levels of party 
nationalisation seem to suggest: (1) the inability of the newly emergent organisations 
to reinforce a party electoral geography based on strongholds, (2) the citizens’ 
tendency to cast votes according party labels and not candidates’ characteristics. 
The high levels encountered in the turnout nationalisation index imply the existence 
of political indistinctiveness installed within territory, regardless of historical and 
cultural specificities. 
NATIONALISATION AND LOCAL ELECTORAL COMPETITIONS
Following a liberal tradition concerning the separation of powers which also 
implies a territorial dimension (the division between central and local government), 
the local elections are ways for citizens to directly select their decision-makers. At 
the same time, local elections allow territorial communities to philologically and 
socially individualise their capacity of self-government1. Illustrating the historical 
differentiation between centre and periphery, even in hyper-centralised states, the 
local electoral processes follow different logics of citizenships and are meant to censure 
and reveal other dimensions of politics. More exposed to public accountability due to 
the proximity between the officeholders and the public, described by the ”interplay 
between politics and administration”, the local level discloses different facets in the 
articulation of political representation2.
1 See Y. MENY, V. WRIGHT (eds.), Centre-Periphery Relations in Western Europe, Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1985; A. DELCAMP, Les institutions locales en Europe, PUF, Paris, 1990.
2 Kristof STEYVERS, Tomas BERGSTRÖM, Henry BÄCK, Marcel BOOGERS, José Manuel 
Ruano DE LA FUENTE, Linze SCHAAP, ”From Princeps to President? Comparing Local 
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In the Romanian case, the hyper-centralised tradition of the Communist state 
dismantled the sense of local community, by practicing a monopolistic interpretation 
of the country’s territorial structure1. The popular councils formed by directly 
elected deputies in single member constituencies selected among themselves the 
members of executives councils and their structure of leadership (at county, city, 
village levels). Nevertheless, even these indirect forms of election were bogus as 
the selected persons needed the approval of the superior political bodies in order 
to occupy their offices. Presidents of the executive councils were also mayors of the 
territorial units2. The inherited structure of the local administration was preserved 
after the fall of communism, although new regulations publically announced the 
introduction of decentralisation3. The post-communist period was mainly described 
by the continuity of administrative centralism of the socialist state, this time with 
the extreme multiplication of political actors4. Accordingly, the local administration 
system was articulated on three layers: local, county and regional (even if the latter 
remained rather a fictional entity, without disposing of a proper administrative 
apparatus). Instead the two other strata were articulated on a symmetrical logic with 
the national administration5 comprising deliberative bodies (County or Local councils) 
and executive positions (mayors, and starting with 2008 County presidents). 
Following the representativeness ideal imposed in all the new democracies, the 
local administrative reform was doubled by a change in the electoral procedures. 
Although the direct elections of mayors are far from being the rule in the Western 
European countries, almost all the post-communist countries had embraced this 
electoral system. The only exceptions are the Czech Republic and Latvia that opted 
for the indirect elections of mayors. In the Romanian case, the indirect election of local 
authorities was partly abandoned immediately after the fall of communism, first by 
adopting the two-round majority system for the selection of mayors and the PR on 
closed list for local councilmen. Starting with 1996, the County Councils are also directly 
elected on a PR basis. As in the case of general elections an additional threshold was 
introduced in the 2000 elections meant to stop the fragmentation of the local political 
scene. The quest for more local accountability and political transparency pushed even 
further the electoral reforms. Since 2008 the presidents of the County Councils are 
directly elected following a one round majority system (following the examples of 
mayoral elections in Slovakia and recently in Hungary). The rapid rejection of the 
communist electoral system was motivated, as in the national elections, by the pursuit 
of leadership legitimacy. The subsequent electoral reforms that doubled the national 
experience imposed however within the local units heteroclite logics in the selection 
of representatives: (1) more political accountability due to the introduction of direct 
forms of selection, and (2) less inclusiveness resulting from legal thresholds. 
Political Leadership Transformation”, Local Government Studies, vol. 34, no. 2, 2008, pp. 131, 134. 
See also John STEWART, The Nature of British Local Government, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2000, 
p. 43.
1 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic...cit., p. 50.
2 According to the Law no. 57, 26th of December 1968 regarding the organization and 
functioning of popular councils, Official Journal, no. 168/26 Dec. 1968.
3 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic...cit., p. 52.
4 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, cit., p. 105.
5 Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic...cit., p. 52.
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The majority and the proportional logics both present in these elections produced 
rather conflictive situations than civic engagement. With the exception of the last 
scrutiny, the turnouts in local elections remained lower than in the parliamentary race. 
In 1992, 65% of the citizens participated to selection of theirs local representatives. 
Since then, the turnout remained stable around 50% of the adult population (56.47% 
[1996], 50.85% [2000], 54.23% [2004], 50.65% [2008]). Although the local elections 
should raise more interest on the behalf of voters directly affected by the local policies, 
they remained, in this case, rather second order elections (see Table 3). The electoral 
volatility, the disproportional seats allocation mechanism and the fragmented nature 
of party politics are also describing the local political scene. In the 1996 elections 136 
electoral competitors (19 electoral alliances, 33 minority unions) presented lists in 
different counties, whereas in 2008, the number dropped to 51 (from which 9 electoral/
local alliances, 18 minority representatives). As in the case of national politics, 
the progressive stabilisation of the local party systems was doubled by moderate 
tendencies towards the concentration of votes on the main political competitors. For 
instance, if in average 61.31% of the mandates for the County councils were occupied 
in 1996 by the representatives of the parliamentary parties, this percentage increased 
up to 69.74% in 2000, 85.82% in 2004 and 84,57% in 2008. Correspondingly, until 2000, 
in the mayoral elections the percentage of the parliamentary parties’ representatives 
remained below 70%. In 2004 a substantial change was registered as 93.02% of the 
mayoral mandates were allocated to the parliamentary parties (85.52% in 2008). 
At a first glance, the local elections in Romania reproduce similar trends with 
the national party behaviour. The absence of nationwide party linkages and the lack 
of local democratic traditions should be conducive to a homogenisation of voting 
behaviour in these locally focused electoral processes. Following the idea that the PR 
elections should encourage more territorial uniformity than in the case of majority 
elections, the nationalisation scores (calculated on the aggregate data at the county 
level) should however express lower regularities in the mayoral elections than in 
County Councils elections. Indeed, until 2008 this seems to be the general trend. 
Both in the case of the County Council elections and in mayoral elections there is 
a clear pattern of nationalisation of electoral choices. Although with lower values 
than in the general elections in the early 90s, as expected, an indisputable process 
of homogenisation of electoral support can be depicted, even in these local races. 
Within this framework, the 2008 electoral process is rather puzzling. The mayoral 
electoral results that should rather impose personal voting, given the personalisation 
of performances in conducting local affairs, displayed higher levels of nationalisation 
than in the case of County Councils. Two alternative explanations can be formulated 
in this regard. First, these electoral outcomes can be linked to the public discourse 
claiming the necessity of a political coherence between the governing coalition’s 
colour and the mayors’ political affiliation. During the last ten years, the governing 
parties’ patronage strategies, targeting the cooption of former proficient mayors as 
candidates for the next elections, forced the electoral results’ alignment in national 
and mayoral competitions. In this scenario, the local party system nationalisation 
process would result from a political adjustment meant to maximise the chances of 
the territorial units to access state resources. The widespread political migration of 
mayors1 (although formally forbidden by law since 2006) became a general practice 
1 Several reports underlined this phenomenon : ”Migraţia politică în administraţia locală 
la un an de la alegerile locale din 2000: Studiu la nivelul primarilor”, Public Policy Institute, 2001 
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in the years 2000, explaining thus the rapid electoral convergence from that point 
on. It appears that the contextual factors and the configuration of party strategies 
weighted more than the electoral laws’ provisions in determining the territorialisation 
of politics. The alternative explanation which was publically advanced in order to 
explain this atypical situation refers to the institutional factors and the 2008 electoral 
reform. Considering that the redistricting process for the national elections took into 
account the previous electoral performance of mayors, the convergence between 
mayoral and legislative elections has been considered a sign of gerrymandering.
Despite of a certain number of common features, different logics still subsist in 
national and local electoral competitions. In the beginning of the 1990s, parties created 
local alliances prior to the electoral scrutiny without necessarily reproducing the 
national leaders’ choices. During the recent years, the political parties adopted similar 
political strategies only following the local elections in order to allow the creation 
of majorities in the newly elected Local and County Councils. In this manner, local 
and county council coalitions emerged that reunited parties from the governmental 
coalition with parties from the opposition1. These initial coalitions remained effective 
even after the general elections introduced other majorities, diverting or reconfiguring 
(in theory at least) the burden of accountability and the distribution of negative 
voting in local elections. Nevertheless, when observing the party nationalisation 
scores (Table 5) the regularity of the voters’ choices across the territorial units is quite 
obvious. Alike general elections, the local competitions produce party nationalisation 
scores that are influenced by a myriad of parties some of them disposing of very 
low levels of party nationalisation (for instance PUNR which in 1996 disposed of 
a nationalisation score touching 0.44). The mayoral elections allow however the 
identification of distinctive traits for the comprehension of the electoral behaviour 
homogenisation. The individual party nationalisation scores displayed rather lower 
scores (especially in 2004) than in the case of County council elections (see Table 5). 
In almost all cases, these differences cannot be accounted for without taking a closer 
look to parties’ strategies and internal reconfigurations. 
DETERMINANTS OF THE TERRITORIAL HOMOGENEITY 
IN THE ROMANIAN CASE
The first post-communist elections reflected high inequities between the registered 
political competitors: on one side, the successor parties, inheriting the structures 
of the former communist party, on the other the newly emergent parties with no 
financial means or organisational structures able to compete in all the territorial units2. 
available online http://partide.resurse-pentru-democratie.org/migratia.pdf (last accessed on 
December 2011); ”Migratia politică în administraţia locală la un an de la alegerile locale din 
2004: Studiu la nivelul primarilor între demagogie şi lipsa voinţei politice autentice”, http://
www.ipp.ro/old/altemateriale/migratia%20primarilor%202005.pdf (accessed on December 
2011). See also Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic...cit., p. 57.
1 For such examples in 2004 see CASP Report, ”Local Elections 2004: A Turning Point 
in Romanian Politics”, Bucharest, 2004, http://alegeri.ong.ro/raportCASPEnglish010904.pdf 
(last accessed on December 2011).
2 E. FODOR, E. HANLEY, ”Left Turn in Post-communist Politics: Bringing the Class 
back in?”, East European Politics and Societies, vol. 11, 1997, pp. 190-224; S. WHITE, J. BATT, 
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These discrepancies were less visible in some of the CEE countries as compared to 
Romanian political landscape where the first genuine governmental turnover took 
place in 1996. Paradoxically, the unbalanced contest between the political forces and 
the hegemonic position of the successor party factions’ were not transposed in high 
discrepancies in the electoral support throughout the territory. The historical parties’ 
nationalisation scores displayed values that were even higher than the ones of the 
newly (re)born social-democrats. This situation can be traced back to the communist 
heritage. Nevertheless, the gradual increase in the party system nationalisation in the 
Romanian case suggests the possibility of other post-communist factors conducive 
towards the homogenisation of the electoral behaviour across constituencies such as 
the electoral system and the party organisational development1. 
Political Institutions, Party Regulations and Electoral Outcomes
Political institutions and electoral regulations have been known to hinder or 
facilitate via direct or indirect effects political representation2. Immediately adopted 
after the breakdown of communism, the PR electoral formula responded to several 
ideals: (1) the discontinuity with the communist past (when elections were held 
following one round majority principle in single-member constituencies)3, (2) the 
continuity with the interwar tradition which was perceived as the golden age of 
democratic behaviour in the Romanian history4, (3) the emergence and consolidation 
of party pluralism conceived as congruent to the democratic frameworks5, and (4) 
the representation and pacification of conflicts resulting from the ethnic divided 
structure of the country6. Since then, as already mentioned in the previous sections, 
the highly inclusive electoral system for the parliamentary elections suffered 
numerous reforms evolving towards majority effects (see Table 6). The ”proportional 
non-representativeness”7 of the Romanian electoral system influenced by the electoral 
P.G. LEWIS, (eds.) Developments in Central and East European Politics, Palgrave, Macmillan, New 
York, 2003. 
1 First suggested by Daniel BOCHSLER, ”The Nationalization of Political Parties...cit.”, 
see also Ingrid VAN BIEZEN, Daniele CARAMANI, ”The Nationalization of Party Systems in 
Central and Eastern Europe: Trajectories, Conditions, Outcomes”, paper presented at the ECPR 
Joint Sessions, Rennes, 11-16 April 2008. 
2 Russell J. DALTON, Christopher J. ANDERSON, ”Nested Voters: Citizen Choices 
Embedded in Political Contexts”, in IDEM (eds.), Citizens, Context, and Choice. How Context 
Shapes Citizens’ Electoral Choices, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 242.
3 Alexandra IONESCU, Du Parti-État à l’État des partis. Changer de régime politique en 
Roumanie, Editura Academiei Române, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 239.
4 Marina POPESCU, ”Romania: Stability Without Consensus”, in S. BIRCH, F MILLARD, 
M. POPESCU, K. WILLIAMS (eds.), Embodying Democracy: Electoral System Design in Post-
Communist Europe, Palgrave, New York, 2002, pp. 90-109.
5 Jean-Benoit PILET, Jean-Michel DE WAELE, ”Electoral Reforms in Romania...cit.”, 
pp. 63-79.
6 D. HOROWITZ, Ethnic Groups in Conflict, University of California Press, CA, 1985, 
pp. 293, 303; H. TUSAN, ”Ethnoregionalist Parties as Ethnic Entrepreneurs”, in L. WINTER, 
H. TURSAN, (eds.), Regionalist Parties in Western Europe, Routledge, London, 1998, pp. 1-16. 
7 Daniel BARBU, Republica absentă, cit., p. 168. See also Cristian PREDA, Sorina SOARE, 
Regimul, partidele şi sistemul politic...cit, pp. 96-103.
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reforms but also due to an indirect threshold based on the district magnitude, became 
the main referential in the public debates during the years 2000s1. Analogously, even if 
benefiting from reduced media coverage, the local electoral system reforms imposed 
even more drastic changes. 
Main explicative variable for the party system nationalisation process, the 
electoral system design cannot entirely account for changes in the territorial patterns 
of voting behaviour. Although when compared to other post-communist democracies, 
the majority effects of the Romanian electoral systems constitute an important element 
in explaining the low levels of nationalisation, the micro level analysis of the electoral 
choices tend to infer an opposite situation. The evolution of the Romanian electoral 
regulations followed a path from a pure proportional formula towards more majority 
system effects without decreasing the levels of party nationalisation. If in Russia or 
Ukraine the presence of single seat districts has been quoted as a decisive explanation 
for low party system nationalisation2, the Romanian electoral regulations, implying 
the existence of single-seat colleges, pinpoint to neutral effects of this electoral 
change. Moreover, the last local elections’ results suggested that in mayoral elections, 
following the majority formula, there is more homogeneity than in the County 
councils’ elections (organised on a proportional representation formula).
This paradoxical situation, implying the lack of electoral regulations’ impact on the 
parties’ territorial support is the direct result of a narrow definition of the institutional 
arrangements. The neutral effects or sometimes even counterintuitive consequences of 
the electoral laws can be understood by taking a closer look to the transformations 
occurred in party rules and wider institutional arrangements. If in the early 90s 
the legislators decided to adopt an inclusive solution in defining a political party, 
requiring only 251 members, by 2003 the minimum number of the party members for 
the official registration raised to 25 000 members3. The 2003 law consecrates one of the 
most restrictive regulations on parties in Europe (with the exception of Russia). The 
bill clearly mentioned the compulsory nature of the parties’ territorial basis, by stating 
that the organisations should display lists of support counting at least 700 members in 
18 counties (representing 42% of the overall number of constituencies)4. Performance 
criteria have been introduced as parties were compelled to show that they were able 
not only to gather signatures from their sympathisers, but also to have good electoral 
records during the last two electoral processes either in local or general elections 
(by winning at least 50 000 votes). These exclusive electoral provisions constitute 
favouring elements in explaining along with the electoral threshold the clarification of 
the Romanian political scene. At the same time, the intensive codification highlighting 
the importance of local credentials expressed both in electoral support and party 
reach within the territorial units contributed to an adjustment of party politics in 
what concerns the grassroots organisations. The local presence became in this way an 
1 Jean Benoit PILET, J.M. DE WAELE, ”Electoral Reforms in Romania...cit.”, p. 71.
2 Daniel BOCHSLER, ”The Nationalisation of Post-communist Party Systems”, cit., 
p. 817.
3 For an in-depth analysis of these transformations see Cristian PREDA, Partide şi alegeri 
în România postcomunistă: 1989-2004, Nemira, Bucureşti, 2005; IDEM, România postcomunistă şi 
România interbelică, Ed. Meridiane, Bucureşti, 2002.
4 Alexandra IONAŞCU, Sorina SOARE, ”Le financement des partis politiques et leurs 
transformations organisationnelles. Un apperçu du cas roumain”, Transitions, vol. 52, 2012 
(forthcoming).
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imperative for party official recognition, being rewarded at the same by additional 
stipulations on the financial incentives offered in exchange for good local electoral 
scores. 
The electoral and party reforms in the Romanian case testify of the constant 
quest for extensive codification of the party-voters connections. If the first electoral 
reforms introduced rather non-representative effects, the adoption of single member 
colleges, trademark for a majority effect was presented as the willingness of party 
representatives’ to institute stronger personal links with their constituents. In fact, the 
2008 reform can be read as a way of solidifying previously instituted party regulations 
referring to the importance of local organisations and local linkages. Paradoxically, 
these complementary measures are neutralising each other and their effects on the 
party system nationalisation. On the one side, the electoral laws constitute incentives 
for less party nationalisation, while the parties’ extensive regulations advocate for 
consolidating local branches’ influence in what concerns the electoral support and 
the size of the local party organisations. 
Party Organisational Development: 
An Alternative Explanation of Citizens’ Choices
Historical heritage, late modernisation and difficulties in the articulation of 
cleavages played important roles in the emergent parties’ development. The electoral 
profile of the country1, notably the social-economic differences favoured more or less 
homogenous electoral support. Nevertheless, in the CEE countries party systems’ 
stabilisation has been a party-driven process. The regularity framework of the party 
competition and the creation of the stable party roots within society2 characterising the 
party system institutionalisation become main elements in explaining the clarification 
of the electoral choices. However, only these two criteria cannot account for the 
diversity of the Romanian parties’ individual trajectories. Considering political parties 
as chains of delegation between voters, candidates and officeholders3, the individual 
party institutionalisation on a structural dimension (regarding the reinforcement of 
a well trained personnel and party loyalists4) acquires an important explicative role 
for the integrative electoral behaviour. Resulting from this, the territorial uniformities 
in the voting patterns can be read as parties’ efforts to adapt to new democratic 
settings, depending on the party leaders’ capacity in dealing with the environmental 
1 Dumitru SANDU, Spaţiul social al tranziţiei, Polirom, Iaşi, 1999; Dragoş DRAGOMAN, 
”Geografia electorală a României în 2004. Modernitate economică şi neo-dependenţă rurală”, 
in IDEM (ed.), Alegeri şi alegători în România 2000-2004. Contexte locale şi regionale, Editura 
Universităţii ”Lucian Blaga” Sibiu, Sibiu, 2006, pp. 9-52.
2 Scott MAINWARING, Timothy SCULLY, Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems 
in Latin America, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, pp. 3-37.
3 Kay LAWSON, ”When Linkage Fails”, in Kay LAWSON, Peter H. MERKEL (eds.), When 
Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1988, 
pp. 13-38.
4 Vicky RANDALL, Lars SVASAND, “Party Institutionalization and the New Democracies”, 
Party Politics, vol. 8, no. 1, 2002, pp. 5-29.
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challenges1. In what follows the voters choices are treated as direct replies to parties’ 
strategies and organisational development2.
The Local Organisations Articulation: Party Grassroots
In the development of post-communist parties, their adaptation to the 
democratising environment as their capacity to reflect and to cope with internal 
diversity constituted the main function of the organisational arrangements3. The initial 
top down creation of these political actors as their failure in consolidating strong local 
branches and high membership rolls4 were conducive during the transition years 
towards the homogenisation of their organisational and electoral frailty. Although 
in consolidated democracies political parties were questioned in what concerns their 
abilities to represent citizens and to preserve active party organisations and members5, 
scholars do tend to agree on the fact that voters-party ties and party identification are 
strong incentives in gathering electoral support. Powerful grassroots, the presence of 
active voices acting as linkages with the electorate were portrayed as the sole factor 
encouraging stable electoral support and strong party branches. 
High discrepancies describe the party grassroots characteristics’ both in old and 
new democratic settings. The impressive membership drops registered in the last 
three decades are present in almost all the contemporary democracies6. In this general 
context, the Romanian and the Bulgarian cases were identified as outliers7. If in the 
early 90s, despite the salient divide between the ex-communist and post-communist 
1 Krister LUNDELL, ”Determinants of Candidate Selection. The Degree of Centralisation 
in Comparative Perspective”, Party Politics, vol. 10, no. 1, 2004, pp. 25-47.
2 Nick SITTER, ”Cleavages, Party Strategy and Party System Change in Europe, East and 
West”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 3, no. 3, 2002, p. 447.
3 Maurice DUVERGER, Les partis politiques, Librairie Armand Collin, Paris, 1976; 
F. BOUCEK, ”Rethinking Factionalism Typologies, Intra-Party Dynamics and Three Faces of 
Factionalism”, Party Politics, vol, 15, no. 4, 2009, pp. 455-485/p. 475.
4 Pascal DELWIT, ”Still in Decline? Party Membership in Europe”, in Emilie VAN HAUTE 
(ed.), Party Membership in Europe: Exploration into the Anthills of Party Politics, Éditions de 
l’Université de Bruxelles, Bruxelles, 2011, pp. 25-42. 
5 Hans DAALDER, ”Parties: Denied, Dismissed, or Redundant? A Critique”, in Richard 
GUNTHER, Jose RAMON-MONTERO, Juan J. LINZ (eds.), Political Parties: Old Concepts and 
New Challenges, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 2002, pp. 39-57. See also Richard S KATZ, 
Peter MAIR, ”Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy: The Emergence 
of the Cartel Party”, Party Politics, vol. 1, no. 1, January 1995, pp. 5-28. 
6 Ingrid VAN BIEZEN, Peter MAIR, ”Party Membership in Twenty European Democracies, 
1980-2000”, Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, 2001, pp. 5-21; Ingrid VAN BIEZEN, Peter MAIR, Thomas 
POGUNTKE, ”Going, Going, . . . Gone? The Decline of Party Membership in Contemporary 
Europe”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 51, no. 1, 2012, pp. 24-56; Paul G. LEWIS, 
”Political Parties”, in Stephen WHITE, Judy BATT, Paul G. LEWIS (eds.), Developments in 
Central and East European Politics, Duke University Press, Durham, NC, 2003, pp. 153-172. See 
also Aleks SZCZERBIAK, ”Party Structure and Organisation in Post-Communist Poland”, 
Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, vol. 17, no. 2, 2001, pp. 94-130; IDEM, ”The 
New Polish Political Parties as Membership Organizations”, Contemporary Politics, vol. 7, no. 1, 
2001, pp. 57-69.
7 Maria SPIROVA, ”Political Parties in Bulgaria. Organizational Trends in Comparative 
Perspective” Party Politics, vol. 11, no. 5, 2005, pp. 601-622/p. 606; For the 2000-2007 period see 
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representatives, political parties did indeed share a trait of weak implantation in 
society1, this pattern has soon been abandoned. The official party records in Romania 
showed that in 2003 – 10.15% of the voters were also party members (12.31% if we are 
to include the UDMR), in 2007 – 6.78% (8.7% with UDMR) and in 2011 – 6.87% (7.74%). 
Representing rather rough estimates of the party membership bases, these figures 
portray the Romanian parties as strong party organisations. Even if these overall 
numbers are not describing only the parliamentary parties’ membership structure, 
the inflation of party members became a constant presence of the Romanian politics 
(see the appended Table). Opposing the mass structure of the social democrats (1996 
– 250 000 members, 2003 – 385 481, 2007 – 290 116, 2011 – 409 833) and the UDMR 
(1996 – 410 000, 2003 – 400 000, 2007 – 350 000, 2011 – 160 7002) that maintained high 
membership structures during the whole period, to the other post-communist parties: 
the liberals (2003 – 73 185, 2007 – 116 134, 2011 – 131 908) and the democrats (1997 
– 135 288, 2003 – 148 922, 2007 – 86 461, 2011 – 86 817), the general anatomy of the 
Romanian parties suggest the emergence of important membership rolls as favouring 
elements for stable party electorates3. 
The above mentioned official records are not complete lists of all the party 
members. According to the Romanian regulations the parties are compelled to 
abide by the minimum criterion specified in the party regulations. Nevertheless, a 
general analysis of the members’ nationalisation scores in 2007 and 2011 suggest that 
Romanian parties display unequal territorial distribution of their officially registered 
members. If the social-democrats during the recent years increased the homogeneity 
of their local organisations’ strength (the membership nationalisation score touched 
0.82, similar to the party nationalisation index), the liberals (0.77), but especially the 
democrats’ (0.52) public records suggest an electoral strategy based on strongholds. 
Even though, in the absence of party members’ constituency data an in-depth analysis 
cannot be conducted for the entire post-communist period, these recent trends 
suggest that regardless of party organisational strategies, the homogeneity of the 
electoral support for parties in the territorial units is not directly dependent on the 
local implantation of these organisations. 
Conversely, the thesis of a direct relationship between party finance and 
membership structure of political parties is a more suitable explanation for these 
unusual levels of participation to the party life. During the 2000s, the Romanian 
parties were more reliant on subscription fees and private donations (indirectly linked 
Sorina SOARE, Alexandra IONAŞCU, ”Cultivating Large Membership Rolls: The Romanian 
Case”, in Emilie Van HAUTE, (ed), Party Membership in Europe...cit., pp. 61-77. 
1 Tom GALLAGHER, ”The Emergence of New Party Systems and Transitions to 
Democracy: Romania and Portugal Compared”, in G. PRIDHAM, P. LEWIS, (eds.), Stabilising 
Fragile Democracies: Comparing New Party Systems in Southern and Eastern Europe, Routledge, 
New York, 1996, pp. 206-229/p. 219.
2 Data generously provided by the party to Sorina Soare.
3 For the 1996/1997 period see Alexandru VOICU, ”Party Organizations and Political 
Recruitment, The Case of Romania”, ECPR Summer School on Parties and Party Systems, EUI, 
Florence, 10-21 September 2007. For UDMR see Reka HORVATH, La représentation politique de 
la minorité hongroise de Roumanie: l’Alliance Démocrate Hongroise de Roumanie, thesis defended at 
ULB. The data for PDSR are extracted from party documents. See also Alexandra IONAŞCU, 
”Les partis politiques roumains. L’histoire d’un développement inattendu”, Studia Politica. 
Romanian Political Science Review, vol. VIII, no. 3, 2008, pp. 589-623; Alexandra IONAŞCU, 
Sorina SOARE, ”Cultivating Large Membership Rolls...cit.”, pp. 61-77.
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to party members) than on state subventions1. Moreover, the differences between the 
symbolic low value of simple members’ subscriptions and the fee paid by party leaders 
and public officials can suggest an organisational tradition of concealing the party 
elite character by maintaining the impression of large organisations. In this regard, 
an alternative/complementary explanation can also be formulated. The low levels of 
membership dues for the ordinary members constitute incentives to participate to the 
party life and activities2. Contrary to this, the high subscriptions fees required for the 
party officials can be interpreted as implicit barriers in the participation to internal 
party contests for elected or appointed positions. 
Party Candidates: The Electoral Personalisation of Parties
The Romanian organisational behaviour follows a pattern of ”Americanisation”. 
The highly volatile party membership records are similar with the voter registration 
process in the US, depending on the electoral timeline or legislative constraints. 
The analysis of the party grassroots as main factors ensuring a direct relationship 
with voters in different constituencies does not suggest the existence of a correlation 
between membership distribution in different constituencies and uniform patterns 
of electoral support. Nevertheless a more indirect explanation can be hypothesised. 
While the intra party discontent and the articulation of party factions characterised 
all the post communist parties, the successful organisational constructions were the 
ones in which the internal conflicts were pondered by a reasonable appreciation of the 
promotion procedures and party activities3. The candidate selection for public offices 
constitutes a manner of rewarding party loyalists4. At the same time, the recruitment 
procedures are also an ex ante mechanism of screening the future officeholders5 
in order to prevent political unreliability. The institutionalisation of democratic 
practices within parties6, implying inclusive candidacy and selectorates but also a 
decentralisation process can account for homogenous electoral support through the 
territorial units. The mobilisation of local organisations in selecting party leaders, a 
balanced representation of public officials according to a territorial dimension can 
explain the uniformity of the citizens’ electoral choices. Following this thesis, the 
formal party arrangements and party practices inflict on local party organisations 
1 See Alexandra IONAŞCU, Sorina SOARE, ”Le financement des partis politiques…cit.”.
2 Reuven Y. HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT, Democracy within Parties Candidate Selection Methods 
and Their Political Consequences, Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 43.
3 Jean Michel DE WAELE, Alexandra IONAŞCU, ”Les Partis Politiques en Europe Centrale 
et Orientale. L’organisation interne des partis politiques a-t-elle encore de l’importance?”, 
Transitions, vol. XLVIII, no. 1, 2008, pp. 5-11.
4 Angelo PANEBIANCO, Political Parties: Organization and Power, Cambridge University 
Press, 1988, pp. 36, 39, 43.
5 Thomas SAALFELD, ”Members of the Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: 
Agency Relations and Problems of Oversight”, European Journal of Political Research, vol. 37, 
no. 3, 2000, pp. 353-376. 
6 Reuven Y. HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT, Democracy within Parties Candidate Selection...cit, 
p. 18. See also IDEM, ”Candidate Selection Methods and Consequences”, in Richard KATZ, 
William CROTTY (eds.), Handbook of Party Politics, Sage, London, 2006, pp. 109-122; Lars BILLIE, 
”Democratizing A Democratic Procedure? Myth and Reality? Candidate Selection in Western 
European Parties”, Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 2001, pp. 363-380.
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and on the role of different party layers in relating to the general public, and thus 
ultimately in gathering voters’ support. 
The formal party arrangements1 stipulate in all the statutory provisions the party 
members’ right to candidate for a leadership position. The internal selection process 
varies in the degree of inclusiveness in what concerns the party members’ participation 
to the internal selection contests (organisations that are called to propose or to vote 
for the candidates), but also fluctuated constantly in what concerns the degree of 
decentralisation (the level where the final list of candidates is decided)2. In the early 
90s all the political parties presented centralised patterns of internal recruitment. The 
national leadership had the final saying in what concerns the candidate selection. 
Nevertheless, 10 years after the fall of communism different patterns of recruitment 
occurred. Such an example is represented by the liberals in 2002 that adopted for 
several years an internal procedure introducing a ”meritocratic criterion”. The party 
leadership had the right of establishing the candidates’ lists for the local branches 
with poor electoral performances. Meanwhile, the national leadership only validated 
the lists of candidates formulated by the local organisations displaying local electoral 
results above the national average. This decision that preceded the adoption of party 
finance regulations (advocating the importance of local electoral results in establishing 
the state subventions) rapidly contributed to the development of local party branches. 
In the cases of two other parties, other selection mechanisms were tested. The UDMR 
(1995) and PSD (2003) have chosen at different moments in time to introduce more 
inclusive structures in the general definition of their selectorate. Consequently, the 
closed primaries system was implemented. This measure was applied only once 
in the PSD’s case (2/3 of the candidates resulted from this type of direct elections) 
and it became, until recently, fully implemented in the case of the UDMR. At the 
opposite end, the democrats presented the most centralised system of selection, as the 
national leaders were the ones constructing the party lists. These general provisions 
were doubled by highly exclusive definitions of candidacy. Party seniority and party 
activity in recruiting new members were some of the formal requirements adopted in 
order to be selected or appointed in official positions. 
The post-communist parties displayed numerous internal designs. However, their 
continuous reconfigurations were primarily linked either to extensive centralisation 
or to high levels of inclusiveness (primary systems). These two antithetical (extreme) 
choices were considered at the level of the literature as determinants for national party 
leadership continuity and insulation of local party leaders3. The local and middle 
levels elites’ impairment is known to hamper the creation of party strongholds, 
annulling the local parties’ organisations impact on voters’ choices, and thus creating 
the premises of uniform voting patterns. However, these recruitment procedures are 
partially misleading. In order to institute a functional organisational pattern they are 
supposed to last for a while without major amendments. The frequent reconfigurations 
1 For a detailed analysis of statutory evolutions see Alexandra IONAŞCU, ”Les partis 
politiques roumains...cit.”, pp. 589-623.
2 Gideon RAHAT, ”Candidate Selection: The Choice Before the Choice”, Journal of 
Democracy, vol. 18, no. 1, 2007, pp. 157-170.
3 Richard KATZ, ”The Problem of Candidate Selection and Models of Party Democracy”, 
Party Politics, vol. 7, no. 3, 2001, pp. 277-296.
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of the internal party regulations, from one party convention/Congress to another, 
introduced organisational unpredictability circumventing the consecration of clear 
logics of career pathways to power or stable structures of incentives. Furthermore, 
starting with 2008, a new development was introduced. Without being codified in the 
parties’ statutory provisions, the main political competitors defined a new candidate 
selection procedure based on opinion polls. Considered to be one of the most inclusive 
and decentralised process of selection1, because it implies voters’ choices prior to the 
elections this mechanism remained however a retrospective method of validating 
initial party choices. In this case, the size of the selectorate and the candidacy 
dimensions were rather unexplained. Nevertheless, as Katz suggested for all forms 
of party primaries, the extreme inclusiveness in the selection process constitute good 
ways of promoting the already known public figures, and thus in consolidating the 
status quo.
The general trend towards broadening the participation of the party members 
and the pursuit of publicising the appearance of more democratic patterns of 
selection are not sufficient in order to estimate the party branches’ role in mobilising 
votes. Although it has been argued that inclusive mechanisms of selection and 
decision making within parties encourage political participation2 and good public 
images, the adoption of such mechanisms is meaningless when it does not produce 
representativeness effects. Or in the Romanian case, in spite of different party 
arrangements, these procedures did not imply a pervasive process of selection, nor 
did it create different outcomes in the general profile of parties representatives in 
public offices. In fact, the officeholders’ career patterns reveal a remarkable instability 
which is challenged only by the importance of local credentials and incumbency. For 
instance, although the lack of previous experience in the political field remains a 
constant in the MPs selection, the local resources constitute a vital asset for their 
promotion in eligible positions/colleges: in 1990 – 20.86%, in 1992 – 19.66%, 1996 
– 16.32%, 2000 – 30.44%3 and 36.4% in 2004-2008 of the Romanian deputies were 
benefiting from a previous political experience at county or local level. These general 
figures suggest the increasing role of local organisations in the candidate selection 
or at least the importance of local credentials for candidacy within all the Romanian 
parties. At the same time, the high incumbency levels represented a constant of the 
post-communist period. In Chamber of Deputies: 1992-1996 29% of the elected MPs 
were former members of the Parliament, in 1996-2000 – 34% were incumbents, 39% 
were displaying a similar profile in 2000-2004, while 42% of the Romanian deputies 
had shared a similar experience in the previous legislative terms. Slightly higher 
percentages are also displayed by the party senators. These overall percentages are 
however hiding a strong party variation. While the UDMR and PSD exhibit gradual 
trends in increasing the reselection of their former MPs, other political parties show 
sinuous trends, also resulting from the variability of their electoral performances. 
For example in the Chamber of Deputies the PNL had 24% re-elected incumbents in 
1996, 70% in 2000 and 26.56% in 2004, while PD/PDL had 90% incumbents in 1992, 
around 70% in 1996 and 2000, but only 33% in 2004-2008 legislature. According to 
1 Reuven Y. HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT, Democracy within Parties Candidate Selection...cit., 
p. 41.
2 Gideon RAHAT, ”Candidate Selection...cit.”, p. 166. 
3 Laurenţiu ŞTEFAN, Patterns of Political Recruitment, Ziua, Bucureşti, 2004, p. 217.
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these data, the parliamentary parties appeared to have indirectly narrowed down the 
inclusiveness of the selection process1, without however neglecting the role of local 
constituencies.
Similarly, in the cases of the governmental elites, the local credentials started to 
play an important role, particularly in the recent times. Phenomenon introduced by 
PD in 1996-2000, developed during the last years of the social-democratic government 
(2003-2004), the importance of ministers’ regional background became a new criterion 
of selection. Resulting from this, during 2004-2008 governmental term one quarter 
of the Romanian ministers were exhibiting local political credentials, and 59% of 
them were also leaders of local party organisations2. A slower pace in imposing local 
credential is also identifiable in the junior ministers’ case. In during 2000-2008, 7% 
these executive actors were former local leaders. Although the mobility between 
local and national levels is reduced, numerous public statements by the end of 2000s 
announced the cooption in governmental teams of junior ministers recommended by 
the local branches leadership. This recent pattern follows a wider trend of crystallising 
informal criteria for the governmental portfolios. The reappointment procedures both 
in ministerial and junior minister positions remained high during the whole period. 
In the creation of the governmental teams in 1996-1998 20% of the ministers had 
already accumulated a previous executive experience, during 2000-2004 their number 
represented 35% of the members in the cabinet while in 2004-2008 around one quorter 
of the ministers shared this type of political profile.
It appears thus that although the party internal arrangements have evolved 
towards inclusive electorates and stable candidacy definitions’, in what concerns 
the recruitment outcomes the general profile displayed by the party officeholders 
emphasizes a general process of exclusiveness on these two axes. Contrary to the 
hypothesis of a stratarchical construction of politics in a nationalised political 
system, the parties’ recruitment strategies’ suggest an opposite trend: notably the 
regionalisation of national politics that follows the homogenisation the voters’ choices 
within the territorial units. Although the party organisations are not genuinely 
democratising, the remedy for organisational instability in Romanian politics could be 
exactly the competitive strategy developed by local representatives willing to colonise 
the national level. This behavioural element implies two elements: 1. the different 
formal mechanisms adopted within parties tend to conduce to similar outcomes in 
the selection of candidates; 2. the nationalisation of politics is not to be considered a 
sign of party decline, but instead the outcome of active mechanisms of promotion. 
In this case, the decentralisation without internal democratisation describing the 
recruitment process can explain local branches’ lobby in order to gain key positions 
in national politics. This competitive structure of patronage incentives resulting from 
candidate selection methods can partially explain the parties’ homogenous electoral 
support within the territorial units.
1 Reuven Y. HAZAN, Gideon RAHAT, Democracy within Parties Candidate Selection...cit., 
pp. 27-30.
2 Alexandra IONAŞCU, Les élites et la prise de décision gouvernementale. Considérations 
sur le cas roumain, thesis defended at Université Libre de Bruxelles, 2008, p. 188. See the same 
references for the governmental trajectories in the following section.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS: EXPLAINING TERRITORIAL 
REPRESENTATION IN ROMANIA
The electoral scene in the CEE democracies suggests a general phenomenon 
of convergence in patterns with the Western counterparts in what concerns the 
territorialisation of politics. Soon after the breakdown of communism and resulting 
from different reasons, the voters’ behaviour did not unveil high discrepancies across 
the counties. In this general framework, the Romanian case suggested different 
electoral pathways. Resulting from the exponential development of the Romanian 
party politics and the lack of partisan articulation in the early 90s, the regional 
differences diminished over the last twenty years. 
The nationalisation process which occurred accompanied however different 
institutional regulations, suggesting that the process of nationalisation is taking 
place against some of the denationalisations’ determinants. First, the electoral reforms 
conducing towards more majority effects during the last twenty years did not entail 
regional patterns in the voting choices. A possible explanation for this situation is 
the fact that only the electoral system is not sufficient in order to explain, from an 
institutional perspective, the party system nationalisation levels. A second dimension 
regarding party regulations should be introduced. Indeed, in the Romanian case, the 
political leaders’ choices to adopt ”majority” rules, following their quest for stability 
and party system clarification were doubled by restrictive measures, forcing political 
parties to develop within the territorial units and thus to cultivate local strongholds. 
The coercive measure concerning territorial party representation was doubled 
by selective incentives in party finance procedures and blurred control over party 
revenues based on membership fees.
The electoral system design and the regionalisation of national politics can account 
for some of the differences encountered between the Romanian party nationalisation 
scores and the other countries in the region. Despite the high membership rolls, 
the volatility of party members and the decreased mobilisation in the case of the 
parliamentary parties’ grassroots, coupled with the low turnouts suggest a rather 
different electoral phenomenon. Furthermore, the unbalanced distribution of 
party members within constituencies suggests that high enrolment figures cannot 
account for homogeneous voters’ support. From this perspective, it will be rather the 
disenchantment with politics, and the lack of public trust, the main elements that are 
conducive towards the electoral results’ nationalisation. The limitations introduced 
by the legislative regulations reduced the number of parties, and resulting from 
this, limited voters’ choices. This idea seems to be supported by the analysis of the 
local party scores. With the exception of ethnic voting, no major regional differences 
were identified between the territorial units, and this, although there are important 
historical and cultural differences between regions. Additionally, the diversity of local 
branches’ membership structures is not necessarily a sign of these actors’ influence on 
the national organisation. Paradoxically, no matter the selection patterns within party 
organisations: through party primaries, hyper centralised recruitment, or meritocratic 
criteria, all parties exhibit a surprisingly homogenous profile of their leaders. Two 
main variables seem to matter, the local credentials and incumbency. Contrary 
to this, the overall tendency towards the exclusive outcomes of the recruitment 
process suggests that although parties are far from democratising, they are however 
decentralising. The coherent internal politics of supporting territorial representation 
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for the appointed and selected positions suggest direct and indirect effects of the local 
connections in building up national politics. 
When referring to national politics, decentralisation has been conceived as an 
incentive towards denationalisation. However, in what concerns party politics the 
local officeholders’ presence on the national arena doubled by the incumbency factor 
points towards the opposite direction. In fact, the increased nationalisation factor of 
political parties can be the outcome of the regionalisation of national politics. The 
formal and informal predominance of local barons in the general economy of party 
politics suggest a reverse process of colonisation through which the local ”strongholds” 
gained the control over the national offices, and this, contrary to the continuous party 
internal rearrangements that tried to limit this effect. 
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APPENDIX
Table 1
Voting Turnout in General Elections in CEE Countries 1990-2010
Bulgaria Czech R. Poland Romania Slovakia Slovenia
1990-1991 83.87 96.33 43.20 86.19 96.33
1992-1995 75.23 84.68 52.08 76.29 84.68/75.4 85.52
1996-1999 58.87 76.29/74 47.93 76.01 84.25 75.75
2000-2003 66.63 57.95 46.18 65.31 70.07 72.33
2004-2006 55.76 64.47 40.57 58.51 54.67 61.09
2007-2010 60.64 62.60 53.88 39.20 58.84 65.04
Source: International Idea Supporting Democracy WorldWide 
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=BG (last accessed on 
November 2011)
Table 2
Party System and Turnout Nationalisation in Romania: General and European Elections
 Year  ELECTIONS
Party Nationalisation Turnout Nationalisation
stand 
PNS
weighted 
PNS
stand 
TNS
weighted 
TNS
1992 Chamber of Deputies 0.65 0.58 0.97 0.96
1996 Chamber of Deputies 0.63 0.46 0.98 0.97
2000 Chamber of Deputies 0.69 0.52 0.98 0.97
2004 Chamber of Deputies 0.74 0.69 0.98 0.98
2007 European Parliament 0.74 0.66 0.95 0.93
2008 Chamber of Deputies 0.79 0.65 0.95 0.93
2009 European Parliament 0.79 0.73 0.89 0.84
Sources: National Electoral Bureau * Weighted with district sizes; controlling for districts 
with larger number of parties than at national level (Daniel BOCHSLER, ”The Nationalization 
of Political Parties...cit.”). (In order to calculate the Party Nationalisation Score see http://
www.unige.ch/ses/spo/staff/corpsinter/bochsler/pns, last accessed on October 2011)
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Table 3
Party Nationalisation in Romania General and European Elections
PD/PDL PNL PRM PSD UDMR CDR
%VVE PNS %VVE PNS %VVE PNS %VVE PNS %VVE PNS %VVE PNS
1992 CDEP 10.2 0.84 2.63 0.87 3.9 0.84 27.7 0.80 7.5 0.35 20 0.85
1996 CDEP 12.93 0.89 In CDR 4.46 0.86 21.52 0.82 6.64 0.33 30.17 0.88
2000 CDEP 7.03 0.85 6.89 0.86 19.48 0.86 36.61 0.86 6.80 0.33 5.04 0.79
2004 CDEP 31.81* 0.90(Justice and Truth) 13.65 0.91 36.80 0.90 6.23 0.33 1.96* 0.72
2007 PE 28,81 0.90 13,44 0.88 4,15 0.91 23,11 0.87 5,52 0.38
2008 CDEP 32,36 0.91 18,57 0.88 3.15 na 33,09 0.89 6,17 0.33
2009 PE 29,71 0.89 14,52 0.88 8,65 0.86 31,07 0.88 8,92 0.34
*Only the PNTCD case the main party of the CDR during the 90s %VVE =Percentage of 
Votes, PNS=Party Nationalisation Score. 
Table 4
Party System and Turnout Nationalisation in Romania: Local Elections
Year ELECTIONS
Party Nationalisation
Turnout 
Nationalisation
Chibber/
Kollman Allik
Stand 
PNS
weighted 
PNS
Stand 
PNS
weighted 
PNS
1996
Mayors 1.15 0.83 (0.69*) 0.58 0.50
0.97 0.96County 
Council 1.81 0.84(0.70*) 0.58 0.46
2000
Mayors 1.21 0.85 (0.77*) 0.62 0.55
0.96 0.95County 
Council 1.04 0.89 (0.70*) 0.63 0.52
2004
Mayors 0.40 0.92 (0.74*) 0.66 0.60
0.97 0.96County 
Council 0.45 0.92(0.78*) 0.69 0.69
2008
Mayors 0.69 0.85(0.80*) 0.73 0.67
0.97 0.96County 
Council 0.42 0.92 (0.80*) 0.66 0.65
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Table 5
Party Nationalisation in Romania General and European Elections
PDL PNL/PL93 PRM PSD UDMR CDR
%VVE PNS %VVE PNS %VVE PNS %VVE PNS %VVE PNS %VVE PNS
96
Mayoral 13.11 0.70 2.65* 1.44 0.83 26.28 0.82 4.18 0.24 26.27 0.77
County 
Council 11.27 0.85 2.81* 0.82 4.03 0.84 16.28 0.85 7.06 0.31 19.53 0.84
00
Mayoral 12.89 0.84 8.40 0.81 2.80 0.80 36.74 0.86 4.29 0.29 10.10 0.78
County 
Council 9.91 0.85 6.96 0.83 6.62 0.85 27.44 0.85 6.27 0.31 7.47 0.84
04
Mayoral 15.00 0.79 17.20 0.81 3.39 0.86 41.83 0.85 4.06 0.26 1.58* 0.64
County 
Council 12.79 0.89 15.99 0.91 8.10 0.89 32.71 0.89 5.67 0.33 2.27* na
08
Mayoral 30,46 0.88 19,36 0.85 2,57 0.86 28,03 0.79 4,27 0.28 0,96
County 
Council 28,91 0.88 18,21 0.82 3,75 0.86 27,97 0.87 5,14 0.33 1,05
PNS: Party nationalisation score; %VVE = Percentage of Votes
Table 6
The Evolution of Legislative Framework Regarding Party and Elections in Romania
PARTY 
ORGANISATION
PARTY FINANCE
ELECTORAL 
SYSTEM
LOCAL 
ELECTORAL 
SYSTEM
19
90
/1
99
1
Registered 
parties: statute, 
party program, 
headquarter, the 
financial means 
and 251 members
– Declaration on the party 
finance sources; local 
elections: the foreign 
financing is prohibited. 
No other restrictions.
– in 1992: state subsidies for 
parties that won more than 
5% of the votes in legislative 
elections
PR closed lists 
in multimember 
constituencies, 
the 
redistribution 
of the largest 
remainders 
method, no 
electoral 
threshold + 
representatives 
of national 
minorities; 
(1992) 3% 
electoral 
threshold
Local council – 
PR closed lists. 
Mayors – directly 
elected two round 
electoral system. 
County Council 
Indirect Selection
19
96
– 10 000 members, 
in 15 counties 
(not less than 300 
persons/ county).
– candidates in 
10 constituencies 
every two 
parliamentary 
elections or a 
general assembly 
every 5 years
Four main sources: 
membership fees, 
donations, own activities, 
state subsidies. Membership 
fees: - no limitations (cannot 
be higher than 10 salaries). 
State subsidies: parties 
with a parliamentary 
group + additional sums 
proportional to the no. of 
mandates (some financing 
if obtained more than 2% 
of votes in the general 
elections)
1996: County 
Council directly 
elected : PR closed 
lists
20
00
2000: electoral threshold for local 
and County council: 5% for parties, 
8-10% coalition (depending on the 
size of coalition
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20
03
– 25 000 members 
in 18 counties but 
not less than 700 
in each territorial 
unit.
– candidates in 
18 counties in the 
legislative elections 
and 50 000 votes 
in 2 subsequent 
electoral contests 
no matter the 
nature of the 
elections: local or 
national
Subscriptions: no more than 
48 salaries
– State subsidies: the parties 
that promote women -> 
higher state subsidies 
(% mandates)
General formula = 
75% (proportionally 
to the no/of votes of 
parliamentary parties) + 
25% (proportionally with 
the no of votes in the local 
elections)
2006: Political 
migration 
of mayors is 
sanctioned 
(automatic 
resignation)
20
08
Some restrictions in amount 
of donations during an 
electoral year (when several 
electoral processes are 
organised)
PR mixed 
electoral system 
in multimember 
constituencies, 
452 single-
member 
colleges. (the 
candidates that 
win over 50% of 
the votes obtain 
a mandate). 
An alternative 
threshold – if 
6 deputies or 
3 senators win 
the elections
The direct election 
of County 
Presidents 
(one round 
majority system)
Table 7
Party Grassroots. Party Members and their Evolution in Romania
MEMBERS % DUES
DUES/
M/E PNMB
TERRIT. 
COVERAGE
STATE
P
N
L
2003 73185 19.82 0.44 0.41 NA NA
2007 116134 19.61 1.81 0.63 0.77 98.51%
2011 131908 55.36 3.28 0.72 0.76 93.09%
P
S
D
1997 250000 NA NA 1.45 NA NA
2003 385481 56.08 3.20 2.18 NA NA
2007 290116 44.5 1.95 1.59 0.78 100.00%
2011 409833 54.92 1.57 2.25 0.82 98.73%
P
D
L
1997 135288 NA NA 0.79 NA NA
2003 148922 9.34 0.26 0.84 NA NA
2007 86461 15.06 1.44 0.47 0.46 49.08%
2011 86817 38.13 1.91 0.48 0.52 73.36%
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P
R
M
2003 201827 16.94 0.23 1.14 NA NA
2007 103548 0.24 0.002 0.57 0.72 95.33%
2011 78943 NA NA 0.43 0.69 89.00%
U
D
M
R
1997 410000 NA NA 2.38 NA NA
2003 400000 19.85 0.76 2.26 NA NA
2007 350000 13.44 2.12 1.9 NA NA
2011 160700 3.27** 0.03 0.88 NA NA
 Members 
2003
M/E
2003
Members
2007
M/E
2007
Members 
2011
M/E
2011
Total 
(parliamentary parties)
904729 4.9 779735 4.28 731284 3.99
Overall 
membership figures
1871933 10.15 1235873 6.78 1259957 6.87
Overall membership 
figures (+UDMR)
2271933 12.31 1585873 8.7 1420657 7.74
% Dues = % of party incomes resulting from membership fees, DUES/State 
= ratio between party incomes originating from membership fees/state subsidies; 
M/E=party membership/electoral body; PNMB- the nationalisation of membership rolls 
(county level) ** Data for 2010
